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 Chapter  6 
  The Dynamics of Capitalism 
  
  F. M. Scherer 
 
    In this chapter, capitalism is viewed as the set of 
economic relationships that emerged with the rise of the 
industrial or factory system during the 18th Century.  To be 
sure, there were earlier precedents -- e.g., the commercial 
ventures, local and international, of Venetian and Florentine 
businessmen during the Renaissance.
1  But here we focus on 
production in privately owned, often capital-intensive, 
facilities embodying ever more advanced technologies during and 
following the Industrial Revolution. 
 
  The Industrial Revolution set in motion dynamic forces that 
will be our primary concern here.  Most important among them are 
technological advances that propelled accelerated economic 
growth, changes in the structure of enterprise ownership and in 
the distribution of income among workers and owners, and a 
tendency toward more or less cyclical fluctuations in economic 
activity.  These will be the "dynamics" on which this essay 
focuses. 
 
  I.  Capitalism and Technological Progress 
 
  The most striking feature of industrial capitalism, seen 
either in its early periods or in historical hindsight, is its 
enormous success in implementing technological changes that 
expanded the supply of goods and services available for 
consumption.  No one said it better than Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels in their Communist Manifesto of 1848:
2 
 
  [The bourgeoisie] [Marx's term for the capitalist 
class] has been the first to show what man's activity can 
bring about.  It has accomplished wonders far surpassing 
Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts and Gothic cathedrals; 
                                                 
1     .  See e.g. Shylock's assessment of Antonio's business in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, 
Act I, Scene III:  "[H]e hath an argosy bound to Tripolis, another to the Indies, ... he hath a third 
at Mexico, a fourth for England, and other ventures he hath, squandered abroad....  The man is, 
notwithstanding, sufficient.  Three thousand ducats; I think I may take his bond."  
2     .  Eastman, ed. (1932), pp. 324 and 326.  
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it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all 
former Exoduses of nations and crusades. 
 
  The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly 
revolutionizing the instruments of production ... The 
bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, 
has created more massive and more colossal productive 
forces than have all preceding generations together.  
Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, 
application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, 
steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing 
of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of 
rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground -- 
what earlier century had even a presentiment that such 
productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor? 
 
A Quantitative Overview 
 
  What happened through the capitalistic industrial 
revolution and its successors is compactly shown using estimates 
of real gross domestic product per capita over several 
centuries.  Angus Maddison (2006, Appendix tables) has estimated 
GDP per capita covering numerous nations for three years 
preceding the onset of the Industrial Revolution -- 1500, 1600, 
and 1700 -- plus more continuous series beginning (with some 
exceptions) in the year 1820.  The data have been adjusted to 
hold underlying price levels constant at dollar value purchasing 
power parities prevailing in 1990.  The statistics are almost 
surely less reliable, the earlier the time interval to which 
they pertain, and there is reason to suspect that the 
consequences of the first stages of the Industrial Revolution  -
- i.e., from about 1750 to 1820 -- are underestimated. 
 
  Throwing caution to the wind, we begin with the nation 
commonly viewed as the font of the Industrial Revolution:  the 
United Kingdom.  Figure 6.1 summarizes the Maddison time series.  
A logarithmic scale implies constant exponential growth as a 
straight line trajectory, the growth rate being higher, the 
steeper the line.  For the early years, growth is palpably 
modest, from a value of roughly $714 per capita in 1500 to $1706 
in 1820, implying a growth rate averaging 0.27 percent per 
annum.  From 1820 on, the growth rate increases dramatically and 
perhaps even accelerates slightly in the latter half of the 20th 
century.  The average growth rate between 1820 and 2000 is  
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calculated at 1.36 percent per year. 
  
  Figure 6.2 adds France, the United States, and Japan, 
beginning only with the relatively more reliable data for 1820.  
The United Kingdom started with the highest GDP per capita but 
was surpassed by the United States following World War I.  
France followed a lower trajectory at first, but pulled ahead of 
the United Kingdom after its entry into the European Common 
Market.  Japan lagged as a less-developed nation throughout the 
19th century and was devastated by the consequences of World War 
II, but recovered after the war and took off on an 
extraordinarily rapid growth trajectory until virtually catching 
up with other world leaders.  Its annual growth rate from 1950 
to 1990 -- before stagnation set in -- averaged 5.17 percent.  
Overall, the average growth rates between 1820 and 2000 for 
these four nations were as follows: 
 
        United Kingdom     1.36 percent 
        United States      1.73 percent 
    France           1.62  percent 
        Japan              1.92 percent 
 
  These numbers may seem modest in comparison with the 
Japanese growth experience following World War II and the more 
recent Chinese record (i.e., 5.8 percent between 1980 and 2000), 
but let us consider them in the context of a Gedankenexperiment.   
We revert to the year 800 A.D., when Charles the Great was 
crowned Holy Roman Emperor in Aachen.  Needless to say, we have 
no reliable GDP or population figures for that era.  Let us 
assume the relevant benchmark to be $200 in dollars of 1990 
purchasing power, or one-fifth the average GDP per capita of the 
35 nations identified as least developed among the 174 on which 
the United Nations (2000) presented estimates for the year 1998.  
Assume then that from $200 per capita in year 800, growth began 
and continued until 2000 at the average annual 1.36 percent rate 
attained between 1820 and 2000 by the United Kingdom  -- the 
slowest growing of our four demonstration countries.  What would 
GDP per capita be in 2000?  The answer is $2.45 billion!  In 
1990 purchasing power, the average man, the average woman, the 
average child is a billionaire. 
 
  This of course is inconceivable on a variety of grounds -- 
resource availability, environmental, technological, and perhaps 
even human perversity.  But that is precisely the point.  The  
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economic growth experienced during the two centuries since the 
Industrial Revolution borders on the miraculous.  It truly was a 
revolution in productive power and standards of human welfare. 
 
Economists Puzzle on How It Happened 
 
  Contemporary economists were not unaware that something 
miraculous was happening in the leading capitalistic economies.  
We have seen already that, writing a century after what arguably 
dates the onset of the Industrial Revolution, Marx and Engels 
observed that the capitalist system "has created more massive 
and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding 
generations together."  Details of the Marxist explanation 
follow in a moment. 
 
  First, however, we consider the views of Adam Smith 70 
years before Marx and Engels issued their Manifesto.  Old Adam 
was acutely aware that a "great multiplication of the 
productions of all the different arts" conferring "universal 
opulence" extending to "the lowest ranks of the people" was 
underway.
3  Smith attributed these dynamic changes primarily to 
increases in the division of labor, carrying with them 
increasing dexterity on the part of workmen, savings of time 
when workers focused on a particular activity, and "the 
invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and 
abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many."  The 
third of these change agents operated through capitalists' 
combination of increased capital, embodied in machines, with 
labor.  But Smith's was not simply a vision of increased capital 
intensity and hence mechanization, emphasized by most economists 
for nearly two centuries after The Wealth of Nations appeared.  
Smith recognized (1776, Book I, Chapter I) that the division of 
labor and the improvements flowing from them extended to what we 
today would call engineering, research, and development 
functions: 
 
  Many improvements [in machinery] have been made by the 
ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them 
became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that 
of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, 
whose trade it is to observe every thing; and who upon that 
                                                 
3     .  Smith (1776, 1937), p. 11 (Book I, Chapter I).  
 
5
account, are often quite capable of combining together the 
powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects. 
 
  Despite this seminal insight, Smith had little to say about 
how the processes of invention and development occurred in the 
framework of capitalistic enterprises.  And he could scarcely 
have dreamed what powers his "men of speculation" would unleash.  
Smith marvelled at the division of labor in a pin factory, where 
each worker specialized in a particular facet of pin-making so 
that overall plant productivity was 4,800 pins per worker per 
day.  Two centuries after Smith's opus appeared, Clifford 
Pratten (1980) revisited a modern English pin factory and found 
productivity to have increased to 800,000 pins per worker per 
day -- an average productivity growth rate of 2.6 percent per 
year.  This rate is not much different from the experience of 
modern manufacturing industries generally and much less than 
what one observes in electronic component manufacturing. 
 
  Karl Marx was even less forthcoming than Adam Smith on the 
details as to how technological advances came into being.  But 
in addition to recognizing what enormous gains industrial 
technology achieved, Marx made the incentive dynamics of 
technological advance in capitalistic enterprises a centerpiece 
of his analysis.  The motivating principle of Marx's capitalists 
is to accumulate the capital they command.  Capital is invested 
in plant and equipment with the expectation of surplus value 
that can be extracted from workers cooperating with the capital.  
Additional capital, and equally importantly, technologically 
improved capital, reduces labor cost and, all else equal, 
increases the capitalist's surplus value.  But when all 
capitalists strive for lower labor costs in this way, their 
competition drives product prices down, reducing surplus value.  
And as more capital is used with a given quantity of labor to 
produce more output, the rate of profit or surplus value falls.  
Both of these phenomena conflict with capitalists' desire to 
maximize the profits or surplus value derived from their 
capital, forcing them all the more vigorously to seek and 
implement new labor-saving technologies and also to enter new 
markets in an incessant effort to increase accumulation. See 
Marx (1967), pp. 222-226 and 230-231.  "[D]evelopment of the 
social productivity of labor becomes the most powerful lever of 
accumulation."  Marx (1967), Vol. I, p. 621.  In the quest for 
higher labor productivity, the most successful capitalists also 
build enterprises of ever larger scale, both at the expense of  
 
6
                                                
competitors and (through what later became known as imperialism) 
internationally.
4  As Marx wrote (1967, Vol. I, p. 763):
5  
 
  One capitalist always kills many.  Hand in hand with 
this centralisation, or this expropriation of many 
capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, 
the cooperative form of the labour-process, the conscious 
technical application of science, the methodical 
cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the 
instruments of labour into instruments of labour usable 
only in common, the economising of all means of production 
by their use as the means of production of combined, 
socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the 
net of the world-market, and with this, the international 
character of the capitalistic regime. 
 
  Although strong on incentive mechanisms, Marx was vague on 
exactly how labor-saving and market-expanding technological 
changes were actually accomplished.  Here Joseph A. Schumpeter 
added important insights.  In a pioneering (1912, 1934) book, 
Schumpeter began by postulating an economy typical of what was 
depicted in the newest theories of equilibrium economics -- an 
economy whose firms make at most only routine technological 
changes and hence depart minimally from what Schumpeter called 
"the circular flow."  Into this he introduced entrepreneurs who 
disrupted the circular flow equilibrium by introducing 
"innovations" -- i.e., new products or product qualities, new 
 
4     .  See Lenin (1917).  For a seminal contribution with a more benign explanation, see Vernon 
(1966).  
5     .  See also at p. 627 recognition but not a prediction that an extreme limit to the 
centralization process was to have all capital united under a single enterprise.  More than a 
century later, centralization had not proceeded to anywhere near Marx's limits.  For a review of 
the evidence, see Scherer and Ross (1990), pp. 59-65.  1997, the last year for which Census data 
were available, the largest 100 U.S. manufacturing corporations accounted for 32 percent of total 
manufacturing sector value added.  On Fortune magazine's May 4, 2009, list of the largest U.S. 
corporations in all fields (not only manufacturing), the top 20 accounted for 32 percent of the top 
500 corporations' assets -- a universe smaller than all corporate assets.  Given their emphasis on 
the power of financial capital, Marx and Engels would have been impressed that a merger wave 
brought the share of all U.S. financial institution assets controlled by the largest 20 entities from 
15 percent in 1990 to 62 percent in 2002.  Kaufman (2009, p. 100).  The result was 
implementation of a "too big to fail" policy by the U.S. government in 2008.  
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methods of production, the opening of new markets, the conquest 
of new sources of supply, and/or new methods of business 
organization.  Indeed, Schumpeter emphasized, once an economy 
had settled down into the kind of general competitive 
equilibrium postulated in the most advanced contemporary 
economic theories, innovating was one of the few ways that 
supra-normal profits could be gleaned.  Thus, innovation was a 
principal means of introducing dynamism to the competitive 
system.  The innovations might well displace existing 
technologies and firms, obliterating their profits, but in the 
process, they added to the total value of the goods and services 
available to consumers -- a phenomenon to which Schumpeter gave 
in (1942) the now-popular characterization, "creative 
destruction."  As other firms fought back to defend their 
positions with their own imitative changes, the innovation 
process evolved increasingly to benefit consumers as well as, or 
even instead of, sustaining profits for the original innovators. 
 
  Schumpeter emphatically distinguished (1934, pp. 88-89) his 
notion of innovation from that of invention: 
 
  Economic leadership in particular must be 
distinguished from "invention."  As long as they are not 
carried into practice, inventions are economically 
irrelevant.  And to carry any improvement into effect is a 
task entirely different from the inventing of it, and a 
task, moreover, requiring entirely different kinds of 
aptitudes.  Although entrepreneurs of course may be 
inventors much as they may be capitalists, they are 
inventors not by nature of their function but by 
coincidence and vice versa.... It is, therefore, not 
advisable, and it may be downright misleading, to stress 
the element of invention as much as many writers do. 
 
In Schumpeter's early vision, the innovating entrepreneur was a 
person of vision and action who boldly implemented changes where 
other business firms had defaulted or feared to tread. 
 
  This distinction became blurred in later work.  In his 
(1912, 1934) conception, p. 66, Schumpeter saw as the most 
likely innovator candidates outsiders, i.e., "new men" -- from 
"new firms which generally do not arise out of the old ones but 
start producing beside them."  By the late 1930s he recognized 
that innovations were taking place in new ways, in part because  
 
8
                                                
modern research and development activities had become so costly 
and interwoven with the innovative process that large, well-
staffed, generously-financed enterprises had an advantage over 
newcomers in carrying out technological innovations.  "[T]here 
are superior methods available to the monopolist which either 
are not available at all to a crowd of competitors or are not 
available to them so readily," he wrote (1942, p. 101).  
Therefore, he continued (1942, p. 106), "[T]he large-scale 
establishment or unit of control must be accepted as a necessary 
evil inseparable from the economic progress which it is 
prevented from sabotaging by the [creative destruction] forces 
inherent in its productive apparatus."  This radical change of 
view became the fodder for many subsequent academic 
controversies, theoretical and empirical.  It too has at least 
partly been overtaken by changes in the world, for only four 
years after Schumpeter articulated his revised vision, the 
American Research and Development Corporation -- the first 
modern entity specializing in the provision of capital and 
business guidance to small, high-technology startup ventures -- 
was established.  Similar venture capital firms proliferated.  
Since then, it has become widely recognized, small new ventures 
often prove to be at least as proficient at the game of 
Schumpeterian innovation as established giant corporations. 
 
  In the wake of Schumpeter's 1942 book, a virtual industry -
- encompassing sociologists, technologists, and management gurus 
as well as economists -- emerged to work out the details, 
qualitative and quantitative, on how technological change 
affects economic life.  Indeed, so many scholars had a hand in 
this enterprise that one risks unfairness in singling out 
particular contributions.
6  The essence of what has been learned 
can be summarized briefly.  First, as Schumpeter came to 
recognize, modern technological innovations are often built upon 
advances in basic science and knowledge of technological 
phenomena.  Second, in part because patents often cannot be 
obtained upon basic scientific phenomena and partly because 
sometimes lengthy intervals of time separate a scientific 
breakthrough from its commercial applications, it is difficult 
to "appropriate" economic benefits from investment in pure 
science.  Therefore, conventional market incentives for 
supporting scientific research are deficient, and to sustain 
 
6     .  But see Hall and Rosenberg (forthcoming).  
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progress, science -- Adam Smith's "speculation" -- must be 
financed by government or by philanthropic donors.  Third, 
industrial research and development laboratories commonly enjoy 
comparative advantage in identifying scientific possibilities 
with the best profit-making prospects and carrying them through 
to the stage of practical application.  Fourth, there are rich 
linkages between academic science institutions and industrial 
research establishments.  And fifth, the profit motive can be a 
powerful motivator and allocator of resources into activities 
that yield commercializable innovations.   This point was 
recognized poetically by the eminent economist Kenneth Boulding 
at a 1962 conference:
7 
 
  In modern industry, research 
  Has come to be a kind of Church 
  Where rubber-aproned acolytes 
  Perform their Scientific Rites, 
  And firms spend funds they do not hafter 
  In hope of benefits Hereafter.  
 
A Schematic View of Modern Innovation Theory 
 
  From the hundreds of economic models analyzing how 
technological progress occurs, we present in Figure 6.3 one that 
strips the issues to their essentials.
8  It assumes that firms 
attempt to maximize the surplus of the expected benefits from 
innovation minus expected costs.   
  
  The expected costs are the research and development costs 
required to carry out an innovation, including the costs of 
process research and development, which in turn determines how 
much it costs to produce the eventual product.  R&D costs are 
affected by the general state of scientific and technological 
knowledge.  If knowledge advances continuously and smoothly, the 
cost of carrying out an innovation project is shown by the line 
C(T), which has R&D cost declining at an exponential rate as one 
waits until year T to carry out one's innovation.  The longer 
one waits, the more easily one can solve the requisite technical 
                                                 
7     .  The poem is not included in Boulding's conference paper (1965), but was published in 
Boulding (1980), p. 96. 
8     .  It is derived from Yoram Barzel (1968) and Scherer (1967 and 2007). 
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problems.  This is not the only possible scenario.  Knowledge 
often advances in fits and starts, in which case C(T) will have 
abrupt downward displacements at the time relevant new knowledge 
becomes available. 
 
  The benefits from an innovation (i.e., the surplus of 
expected revenues from product sales minus production costs, 
discounted to present value at the year of innovation T) depend 
upon the state of demand.  If demand is gradually rising, the 
discounted present value of innovation benefits will be larger, 
assuming the same duration of sales on the market (e.g., due to 
finite patent length, or in a mathematically simpler version, 
out to infinity) when the innovation is made at time T+n than at 
time T.  Thus, reflecting the rising power of "demand-pull,"
9 the 
benefits function B(T) rises over time.  Smoothness of B(T) is 
not essential, however, e.g., when demand increases suddenly for 
some reason such as an energy shock or the outbreak of a new 
disease. 
 
  From the vantage point in time of T = 0, as the cost and 
demand functions are drawn in Figure 6.3, the innovation is not 
economically attractive.  Costs exceed benefits.  The project 
reaches the zero profit breakeven point when costs fall into 
equality with (rising) benefits -- i.e., just before the onset 
of year 6.  The more time passing after the breakeven point, the 
more attractive innovation becomes, and hence the higher is the 
likelihood that some entrepreneur will seize the opportunity -- 
perhaps precipitating what appears to be multiple but 
independent innovation.  In a situation of secure monopoly, the 
firm would wait until a much later date -- possibly as late as 
year 15 -- to maximize the discounted surplus of benefits minus 
costs.  But fear of being competitively preempted -- a variant 
of Schumpeter's creative destruction -- forces would-be 
entrepreneurs to advance their R&D project dates -- perhaps all 
the way to year 6, where breakeven occurs.  Competitive 
advancement of the innovation date to breakeven year 6 is the 
analogue in the theory of research and development resource 
allocation to the zero-profit equilibrium of supply and demand 
in the traditional price-setting Marshallian theory. 
 
 
                                                 
9     .  The concept is attributable to Schmookler (1966).  
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 II.  Structural Changes Due to Innovation and Rising Prosperity 
 
  Adam Smith recognized that the structure of national 
economies depended in part upon the choices made in capital 
investments, embodying among other things the latest 
technological improvements, across alternative fields of 
endeavor.  "According to the natural course of things," he 
suggested in Book II, Chapter II of The Wealth of Nations, "the 
greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, 
directed to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of 
all, to foreign commerce."  For the American colonies, he 
observed (1937, p. 347), wealth and greatness stemmed from the 
fact that "almost their whole capitals have hitherto been 
employed in agriculture."  He continued with what was at the 
time conventional wisdom in Great Britain: 
 
  Were the Americans, either by combination or by any 
other source of violence, to stop the introduction of 
European manufactures, and, by thus giving a monopoly to 
such of their own countrymen as could manufacture the like 
goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into 
this employment, they would retard instead of accelerating 
the further increase in the value of their annual produce, 
and would obstruct instead of promoting the progress of 
their country towards real wealth and greatness. 
 
Soon thereafter the colonies became the United States of 
America, and in a 1791 monograph, Alexander Hamilton vigorously 
challenged this thesis.
10   Augmenting manufacturing activity was 
expected by Hamilton to create a more extensive demand for 
America's agricultural surplus at home, develop machinery 
enhancing agricultural productivity, encourage reciprocal trade 
with other nations, provide diversification against foreign and 
domestic demand and supply shocks, shorten transportation links, 
ensure the national supply of essentials such as subsistence, 
habitation, clothing, and defense; and not least, to succeed 
because early manufacturing efforts in the Colonies had already 
shown considerable success.  The United States adopted 
Hamiltonian policies favoring the development of manufactures.  
Indeed, groups of British industrialists visiting the United 
 
10     .  Reproduced in Hamilton (2001).    
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States during the 1850s were surprised to see that U.S. 
factories were using more advanced labor-saving machinery than 
their U.K. counterparts.  See Habakkuk (1962). 
  
  The broad historical trends are revealed by Figure 6.4.  
From 9.5 percent of national totals in 1820, employment in 
manufacturing and mining grew (after being interrupted by the 
Great Depression) to a peak of 33.6 percent during World War II.  
Then, as Hamilton foresaw, manufacturing industries provided a 
decisive element in American military power.  Meanwhile 
employment in agriculture declined steadily from 72 percent in 
1820 (and no doubt even higher in Hamilton's time) to 2.5 
percent in 1999.  Each of these trends warrants further comment. 
 
  The declining share of agriculture was attributable 
primarily to vigorous productivity growth.  In 1820, one farm 
family fed (and helped clothe) 1.4 families.  By 2000, the 
comparable figure was 40 families, not counting the export 
surplus consistently contributed by American farmers.  Between 
1950 and 1990, U.S. agricultural output per unit of labor input 
grew at an average rate of 4.8 percent per year -- a rate 
considerably higher than in other sectors of the economy.  This 
impressive productivity growth is attributable to countless 
technological innovations in the use of fertilizers and 
pesticides, better seed hybrids, and a host of labor-saving 
agricultural machines, complemented by the education and 
training of farmers in land grant universities and agricultural 
extension service facilities.  
 
  Nor was America alone.  It appears to be a law of 
capitalistic development that advances in productivity lessen 
the share of the work force in agriculture.
11  Many other 
technologically advanced nations exhibit agricultural employment 
shares in the same 1-3 percent range prevailing for the United 
States.  Others, and especially those that whose economic 
development is retarded, are more like America in the early 19th 
Century.  For example, among the 61 nations for which The 
                                                 
11     .  This was foreseen by Marx (1967, Book I, Chapter XXV):  "As soon as capitalist 
production takes possession of agriculture, and in proportion to the extent to which it does, 
demand for an agricultural labouring population falls absolutely, while the accumulation of 
capital employed in agriculture advances.... Part of the agricultural population is therefore 
constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat."   
 
13
Economist's Pocket World In Figures 2009 edition reports total 
employment shares, the largest four shares were for Cameroon (70 
percent), Vietnam (58 percent), Bangladesh (52 percent), and 
Morocco (45 percent).  China was tied for fifth at 43 percent.
12 
 
  A simple explanation for agriculture's declining employment 
share as productivity grows is that people's need for food is 
physically constrained.  An economic explanation is rooted in 
Ernst Engel's (1857) law, which states that the income 
elasticity of demand for food is less than unity.  Therefore, as 
real incomes rise, the demand for food rises less than 
proportionately, and so other commodities command an increasing 
share.  For the prosperous United States, the income elasticity 
of demand for food is estimated to be on the order of 0.2, i.e., 
as income rises by 100 percent, food demand rises 20 percent. 
 
  For manufacturing a more complex explanation is required.  
As consumers become more prosperous owing to technological 
change and productivity growth, their consumption shifts from 
agricultural products to manufactured goods with higher income 
elasticities.  With further growth, income elasticities for 
manufactured goods also decline, and so consumers' demand moves 
toward services fulfilling needs for health, enlightenment 
(e.g., education), amusement, mobility, safety (e.g., police and 
fire services at the local level, defense at the national 
level), and community (e.g., telecommunications and churches).  
This could explain the surprising drop in the share of 
employment devoted to manufacturing and mining from 29.6 percent 
in 1953 to 14.3 percent in 1999.  It seems improbable that 
superior productivity growth and hence declining relative prices 
explain the shift in demand toward services, since productivity 
growth has tended to be less rapid in the service sectors than 
in agriculture and manufacturing.
13  Some of the relative decline 
in manufacturing employment is attributable to the growth of 
international trade and a shift of comparative advantage toward 
rapidly developing but still low-wage nations.  Supporting this 
shift is the fact that manufactured goods (and minerals) are 
more easily transported long distances to the consumer than most 
services (although this too is changing with reductions in 
                                                 
12     .  Employment data for India were not reported.  The fraction of gross domestic product 
originating in agriculture was 56 percent higher in India than in China. 
13     .  See Baumol et al. (1989), Chapters 6 and 7.  
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communication costs).  The role of international trade, however, 
must be subordinate to an explanation focusing on relative 
income elasticities of demand for services as compared to 
manufactured goods, since the surplus of U.S. manufactured goods 
imports over exports in the year 2000 was only about 13 percent 
of the sales value of domestic manufactured goods.  The balance 
of trade component seems far too small to account for the 
halving of manufacturing sector employment between 1953 and 
1999. 
 
  III.  Who Benefits from Capitalist Economic Progress?  
 
  Karl Marx is best known for his argument that, despite its 
ability to expand economic output phenomenally, capitalism would 
exploit and impoverish workers (the "proletariat") so severely 
that they would revolt and overthrow the capitalist system, 
substituting a socialist "dictatorship of the proletariat."  
History reveals that he was wrong.  But it is useful to analyze 
the sources of his error. 
 
Marx's Error 
 
  Marx argued that capitalists' drive to accumulate would 
lead them to embrace labor-saving machinery, displacing workers 
in the production of any given quantity of output and relegating 
them into a growing "reserve army of the unemployed."  The 
reserve army would impose pressure on wages, allowing 
capitalists increasingly to exploit the workers still employed -
- i.e., to extract surplus value adding to the capitalists' 
wealth.  The net tendency of rising unemployment plus depressed 
wages would be the immiserization (in German, Verelendung) of 
the working class.  Concentration of workers into larger-scale 
enterprises would facilitate their organization and foment 
eventual revolution.  The climax is characterized in one of 
Marx's most colorful passages (vol. I, Chapter XXXII, p. 763): 
 
  Along with the constantly diminishing number of the 
magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all 
advantages of this process of transformation, grows the 
mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, 
exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the 
working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and 
disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the 
process of capitalist production itself.  The monopoly of  
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capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which 
has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. 
Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation 
of labor at last reach a point where they become 
incompatible with their capitalist integument.  Thus 
integument is burst asunder.  The knell of capitalist 
private property sounds.  The expropriators are 
expropriated. 
 
  Marx went astray most fundamentally because he relied upon 
a misguided theory of price and wage determination -- the labor 
theory of value -- that was overtaken by advances in economic 
theory known as the neoclassical synthesis.  The latter was 
beginning to emerge by 1867, when Marx finished his German-
language draft of Das Kapital, and had triumphed by 1886, when 
Friedrich Engels completed his English translation.   
 
  Developed most thoroughly by the eminent English economist 
David Ricardo (1772-1823), the labor theory of value held that 
commodities' prices were determined by the amount of labor -- 
both direct labor and labor congealed in capital equipment -- 
that went into their production.  But what determined the price 
or value of labor?  According to Marx, it was the amount of 
labor need to produce that labor, i.e., to keep the worker's 
body and soul together and permit reproduction of the work force 
for future generations.  Marx was aware that this "socially 
necessary quantity of labor" would vary with circumstances.  
More skilled workers required more costly training and therefore 
needed to receive higher wages, and, in an aside that might be 
used to rescue some Marxian predictions, Marx admitted that 
wages might depend upon "the degree of civilisation of a country 
... and on the habits and degree of comfort in which the class 
of free laborers has been formed."  Vol. I, Chapter VI, p. 171.  
"Exploitation" was measured by the difference between the value 
of the products created by labor, delineated by their socially 
necessary labor content, and the cost of maintaining and 
reproducing workers.  Technological innovations permitted more 
output and hence more value to be produced with a given labor 
input, widening the wedge between what the laborer had to be 
paid (his reproduction cost) and what he produced.  Competitive 
pressure from the reserve army of the unemployed might also 
allow capitalists to increase the length of the work day and 
hence to widen the value wedge, although Marx recognized that 
maximum workdays were in some nations limited by legal  
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regulations.  The combination of technological progress and a 
growing reserve army meant for Marx an increase in the rate to 
which workers were exploited and constrained workers to lives of 
constant or ever more grinding poverty. 
 
  Although Marx recognized that wages might temporarily be 
raised by unusually strong demand for labor, he lacked a valid 
theory of how both labor markets and product markets reached 
equilibrium -- a theory that emerged only with the neoclassical 
synthesis.  And he lacked an appreciation for "Say's Law," 
articulated in 1803 by Jean-Baptiste Say but incorporated fully 
into economic theory only with the contributions of John Maynard 
Keynes in the 1930s.  Specifically, a reduction in the amount of 
labor required to produce output led, all else equal, to product 
price reductions, increased quantities sold, and, in the 
aggregate, an increase in the real wealth of the economy's 
participants.  More real output meant more compensation in the 
aggregate to producers.  Competition among producers 
experiencing lower costs through technological change ensured 
sooner or later that the benefits from higher productivity were 
not simply captured as additional profit (or surplus value) by 
the capitalists.  Despite various slippages, increases in output 
under Say's Law led to more demand for output  -- in simple 
terms, supply created its own demand.  And -- again with 
possible slippages -- more demand averted the tendency for the 
reserve army of the unemployed to grow and instead flowed back 
into increased demand for labor, which, for a labor supply 
determined by considerations more complex than Marx's simple 
reproduction theory, by no means mandated increasing 
immiserization of the work force and more probably led to 
increased real wages per worker. 
 
The Pure Microeconomic Theory 
 
  Things can go wrong in this rosy scenario, in part for 
reasons anticipated imperfectly by Marx.  We return to one 
aspect of the problem later.  Here, however, it may be useful to 
illustrate what happens to economic values when technological 
innovations are made. Two cases -- process or cost-saving 
innovation and product innovation -- can be distinguished, 
although in practice, they overlap because one firm's product 
innovation can become another firm's process innovation.  See 
Scherer (1982), Chapters 3 and 15.   
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  Figure 6.5 illustrates the process innovation case.  We 
assume a competitive industry in equilibrium with (constant) 
unit costs OC1.  The competitive price equals cost at OC1 and 
output is OQ1.  Now let an innovation reduce costs to OC2.  At 
first the cost saving may be monopolized, so price remains at 
OC1.  If so, the benefits of the cost saving, measured by 
rectangular area C1XYC2 are retained entirely by the producing 
firm(s), i.e., the capitalists.  This implies increased income 
for the capitalists, which, under Say's Law, is spent somewhere 
else in the economy, possibly for additional capital goods but 
perhaps also for new luxuries.  But sooner or later competition 
will force the price down to the new lower cost level OC2.  Then 
output is increased to OQ2, what was the capitalist's gain C1XYC2 
is redistributed as gain to consumers (including workers, who 
will have more money to spend on other goods), and in addition, 
consumers gain a surplus delineated by triangle XYZ.  Once the 
product price falls, the impact of the innovation on the 
quantity of labor used in producing the product in question 
depends upon the elasticity of product demand.  If demand for 
the product is relatively price-inelastic, output after the 
competitive price reduction expands only modestly and labor 
continues to be displaced -- possibly into the ranks of the 
unemployed, but in long-run equilibrium abiding inter alia by 
Say's Law, to make other products.  If demand is quite price-
elastic, the increase in the quantity demanded at reduced prices 
may be so great that, despite the reduction in labor required to 
produce any given unit of output, the total amount of labor 
demanded in producing the relevant product rises. 
  
  The product innovation case is illustrated in Figure 6.6.  
We assume that a completely new product is created, giving rise 
to a new demand curve AD along with a cost function (horizontal 
at level OC1).  Assume that initially the new product is sold 
under monopoly conditions.  The monopolist maximizes its profits 
by setting price OPM, leading to consumption of quantity OQM.  
Fresh labor is hired to produce the new product.  In addition, 
the monopolist gains profits measured by the rectangle PMBE C1, 
which under Say's Law will be spent on other commodities.  
Furthermore, consumers enjoy a consumers' surplus -- i.e., a 
surplus of intrinsic product value over the price they must pay 
-- measured by the triangle ABPM.  There is no reason to believe 
that this surplus should lead to still more employment.  
However, sooner or later competition will emerge in the supply 
of the new product.  Eventually the price falls to OC1.  What was  
 
18
monopoly profit (rectangle PMBE C1) now redounds to consumers as 
consumers' surplus, freeing more funds for the purchase of other 
commodities.  In addition, output increases to C1F, leading to 
more labor being hired and to the realization of additional 
consumers' surplus measured by triangle BGE. 
 
How Are the Gains Shared? 
 
  Sooner or later, consumers (who are also workers) benefit 
from product and process innovations, although the timing and 
magnitudes of the gains can vary.  It is useful therefore to 
turn from pure theory to actual evidence as to how workers have 
fared as a result of the incessant technological innovations 
introduced since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. 
  
  The richest early data come from Phelps Brown and Hopkins 
(1955, 1956) on the wages of building trades craftsmen and 
unskilled workers in southeastern England and the prices of 
products those workers might consume.  Given our concern with 
the fate of Marx's proletariat, we focus in Figure 6.7 on the 
real wages -- i.e., money wages deflated by price indices -- of 
ordinary building laborers during an interval spanning the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution.  For ordinary laborers wages were 
more likely to parallel those in alternative occupations such as 
the proliferating factories, about which Friedrich Engels wrote 
a seminal tract (1845).  During the earliest decades of the 
Industrial Revolution real wages of building workers trended 
downward, not upward.  The explanation probably stems from 
extensive displacement of farm workers, outstripping demand from 
both the emerging factories and alternative unskilled trades.  
The Napoleonic Wars had a sharp negative impact.  After that, 
there was a distinct upward trend as the Industrial Revolution 
gained traction.  Between 1804 and 1883, real wages increased at 
an average rate of 0.85 percent per year.  The annual gain for 
skilled workers was similar.  Immiserization during the period 
surrounding Marx's writing is not evident. 
  
  We pick up the thread with Figure 6.8, tracking the cost of 
living-adjusted wages of manufacturing production workers in the 
United States from 1890 to 2005.
14  From 1890 to the 1970s, there 
                                                 
14     .  The data are spliced from Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition 
(Cambridge University Press: 2006), vol. II, Tables Ba4361-4366, and Table CC1-2; and  
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was a fairly steady increase in manufacturing workers' hourly 
real wages, perceptibly accelerating despite the Great 
Depression and temporarily severe unemployment.
15  The average 
annual rates of growth for extended periods were as follows: 
 
      1890-1930      1.40 percent 
      1930-1970      2.41 percent 
      1970-2005     -0.18 percent 
 
   1890-2005   1.90  percent 
 
Clearly, there is no evidence of immiserization.  The average 
U.S. manufacturing worker of 2005 enjoyed a real wage 4.3 times 
that of his 1890 counterpart.  Nor did a reserve army of the 
unemployed allow employers to extract longer working hours from 
their workers.  Between 1890 and 2005, the average work week in 
manufacturing dropped from 54 to 40.7 hours.
16   
 
  The remarkable and seemingly persistent stagnation that set 
in during the 1970s, however, cries out for explanation.  We 
advance toward that goal following a brief detour. 
 
The Factor Shares Paradox 
 
  Consistent with the predictions of both Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx, production has become more capital-intensive over time; 
that is, capital inputs have increased more rapidly than labor 
inputs.
17  Yet the relative shares of payments to productive 
inputs have tended to be remarkably stable.  Using data 
disclosed by Simon Kuznets and William Fellner, Binswanger and 
Ruttan (1978, Chapter 2) report that the share of labor relative 
to combined payments to labor and capital in the United States 
                                                                                                                                                             
Economic Report of the President, February 2009, Tables B-47 and B-62. 
15     .  During the 1930s new government policies were introduced favorable to unionization and 
the wages of employed workers, even though arguably they may temporarily have displaced 
workers not tracked by Figure 8 into the ranks of the unemployed.  
16     .  Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (1960), p. 92; and 
Economic Report of the President, January 2009, p. 340 (Table B-47).  The figure for 2005 
includes 4.6 hours of overtime.  Overtime was not generally paid at premium rates in the United 
States until 1938. 
17     .  See also Cain and Patterson (1981).  
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varied narrowly between 1920 and 1966 between 61 and 66 percent.  
If capital inputs were rising more rapidly than labor inputs, 
this means that labor wages -- which we know were rising 
steadily until at least the 1970s -- were increasing more 
rapidly than the returns on capital.     
 
  Support for this conjecture is provided by Figure 6.9, 
which traces the shares of total U.S. national income absorbed 
by employees and corporate profits from 1929 to 2000.  Except 
during the Great Depression, the profits share varies between 
7.73 percent (in the trough of the 1982 recession) to 14.69 
percent (at the peak of a post-World War II boom), with no 
statistically significant trend following 1945.  Employee 
compensation trended upward gradually, with a post-Depression 
minimum of 62 percent in 1942 (when the government imposed 
pervasive wage controls) to 74 percent in 1982 (when corporate 
profits were unusually depressed). 
  
  Economic theory applied at an heroic level of abstraction 
can shed light on why labor's share of the national income 
remained relatively steady despite labor-saving technological 
change and rising capital intensity.  We assume that the average 
industry (or in an even more heroic version, industry in the 
aggregate) operates on a production function characterizing how 
output responds to changes in labor and capital inputs.  A 
standard textbook example is illustrated in Figure 6.10.  There 
is a curved "isoquant" showing varying combinations of capital 
and labor inputs that can yield an output of 100 units.  The 
production function shown happens to conform to Cobb-Douglas 
assumptions, with an equation Q = K
.33 L
.67 = 100.  With labor 
costing $1,000 per working month and capital $2 per unit, shown 
by a dashed "isocost" line marked A, the cost-minimizing 
production strategy is to use 16.25 months of labor and 
(rounded) 4,000 units of capital, with labor sharing 67 percent 
in the combined outlay of $24,250.  But a rise in the price of 
labor relative to the cost of capital, indicated by isocost 
lines B and C in Figure 6.10, creates an incentive to substitute 
away from the higher-priced labor and toward the now lower-
priced capital.  Production becomes more capital-intensive.  
From 16.25 units of labor and 4000 units of capital in the 
original equilibrium, the new equilibrium entails 
(approximately) 12.44 months of labor and 6,885 units of 
capital.  Total expenditures on inputs are reduced as a result 
of this substitution to $1225 x 12.44 + $1.09 x 6,885 = $22,744.   
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Labor's share of total outlays is 67 percent -- despite the 
substitution, the same as labor's share was before the relative 
increase in wages! 
 
  This is a rigged example, but it illustrates an hypothesis 
that economists have proposed to explain the relative constancy 
of labor's national income share despite rising wages and rising 
capital intensity.  Specifically, with the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the total output (and hence income) shares 
of capital and labor are equal to the values of the exponents on 
K and L in the production function equation, if production costs 
are minimized and each input is competitively paid the value of 
its marginal product.  It is of course a special case, but there 
is statistical evidence that real-world production functions 
often approximate the Cobb-Douglas form. 
 
The Stagnation of U.S. Workers' Real Wages 
 
  We return now to another anomaly: the pronounced break from 
the long-run trend in rising U.S. manufacturing worker wages, 
which in effect shattered "the American dream," i.e., the 
expectation that each new generation would be much better off 
materially on average than its parents. 
 
  To begin, a tension between the worker wage stagnation 
shown in Figure 6.8, emerging in the mid-1970s, and the absence 
of clear downtrends in the compensation shares revealed by 
Figure 6.9 needs to be clarified.  There are two explanations.   
 
  First, Figure 6.8 focuses on straight wages, without fringe 
benefits.  "Employee Compensation" in Figure 6.9 covers all 
compensation, including fringe benefits.  Other slightly 
incompatible sources show significant increases in the fraction 
of U.S. national income associated with "supplements to wages 
and salaries" -- notably, mandatory Federal Social Security, 
Medicare, and unemployment compensation fund payments levied on 
employers and voluntary employer set-asides for health care and 
retirement pay.  The health care fraction has risen especially 
rapidly as total U.S. health care expenditures have expanded to 
absorb 17 percent of gross domestic product -- offset, to be 
sure, by some employers' cancellation of their health insurance 
programs.  The fractions of all national income flowing into 
compensation supplements in recent time periods is as follows:   
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   1965-70     6.5  percent 
   1971-80     9.8  percent 
      1981-90       11.5 percent 
      1991-99        11.5 percent 
 
Since these contributions clearly confer standard-of-living 
benefits, compensation data that exclude them underestimate the 
welfare conferred upon the recipients. 
 
  Second, the plot in Figure 6.8 covers only the (inflation-
adjusted) wages of manufacturing production workers.  It 
excludes the pay of manufacturing supervisors, which, at least 
for top executives, has increased much more rapidly than the 
wages of production workers.  It also excludes non-manufacturing 
industries, some of which (such as retailing) pay lower wages 
than in manufacturing but others (e.g., law, medicine, 
accounting, finance, and the like) that pay much higher wages.  
One redeeming value of the Figure 6.8 data is that the sample 
approximates Marx's notion of the "proletariat." 
 
  Despite these caveats, there is widespread consensus that 
the average U.S. worker fared badly from the mid-1970s on and 
that the previous trend toward steadily rising real incomes had 
been bent, even if not totally broken.  Several things appear to 
have gone wrong. 
 
  That the changes materialized during the 1970s suggests one 
causal element.  The growth of productivity -- real output per 
hour of labor input in the non-farm sector of the U.S. economy -
- slumped during the 1970s.  Average growth rates over decades 
were 2.39 for the 1960s, 1.69 percent in the 1970s, and 1.59 
percent in the 1980s, with a rebound to 2.33 percent between 
1990 and 2005.  It must be noted that the productivity rebound 
did not yield a wage rebound for manufacturing workers. 
 
  The initially perplexing difficulties in the 1970s did, 
however, contribute to changes in the political climate that in 
turn affected compensation patterns.  Levy and Temin (2007) 
argue that the 1970s precipitated a transition from what has 
been called the Golden Age for labor and the "Detroit Consensus" 
to a "Washington Consensus" less favorable to the interests of 
workers.  The depression of the 1930s led in the United States 
to legislation establishing minimum hourly wages and encouraging 
the formation of labor unions and supporting workers in their  
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collective bargaining.  These were followed after World War II 
by agreements between the Big Three automobile companies and the  
strong United Auto Workers union indexing wages for inflation, 
guaranteeing additional annual pay increments to reward 
anticipated future productivity growth, and extending health 
care and pension programs.  This Detroit consensus then spread 
to other strongly unionized industries.  An initial setback to 
these worker-friendly developments was the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947, which limited unions' ability to picket outlets for the 
goods of producers with whom disputes were pending.  The 1970s 
brought more significant changes in the political climate.  
Deregulation of key industries such as railroads, airlines, 
trucking, and telecommunications undermined seller monopoly 
power out of which generous wages had been paid.  Laws to 
increase the minimum hourly wage lagged price inflation.  
Officials hostile to labor were appointed to mediating bodies 
such as the National Labor Relations Board.  In 1981, President 
Ronald Reagan broke a strike of air traffic controllers by 
threatening to fire persisting strikers within 48 hours.  For 
these and other reasons, the fraction of the U.S. work force 
unionized fell from 24.4 percent in 1955 to 10.5 percent in the 
year 2000, and the incidence of strikes declined sharply.
18 
 
  Macroeconomic measures taken to combat the "stagflation" of 
the 1970s raised interest rates sharply, attracting huge inflows 
of foreign capital and (at least until the late 1980s) raising 
the value of the U.S. dollar.  This gave rapidly industrializing 
nations an opportunity to gain footholds in the U.S. market, 
which were not later relinquished.  Although most academic 
studies attribute only a small role to import competition 
generally in depressing U.S. workers' wages,
19 there was 
undoubtedly a subtle interaction effect as increasing foreign 
competition weakened the position of U.S. import-sensitive 
industries' unions. 
 
  Averages conceal as much as they reveal.  Although U.S. 
production workers' (and indeed most middle-class workers') 
wages stagnated, some employees -- and especially those whose 
skills meshed with changing industry demands -- fared 
exceptionally well.  The proliferation of computers displaced 
 
18     .  Source:  Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years. 
19     .  See e.g. Burtless (1998), Rodrik (1997), and Lawrence (2008).  
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middle-class employees who had performed data processing and 
similar tasks mechanically, but it increased the demand and pay 
for skills in more creative and abstraction-based occupations, 
for whom computers were a complementary input best used by those 
with high skills.  Among the set of all employees, therefore, 
the distribution of wages became more unequal, with high-skill 
workers benefitting and medium-skill workers losing out.
20   
Growing inequality in employee compensation was encouraged by 
competition to hire high-skill individuals; "winner-take-all" 
competitions to garner the skills best-suited for corporate 
leadership, law, medicine, professional athletics, the 
performing arts, and the like;
21 and failures in corporate 
governance permitting boards of directors routinely to approve 
salaries and bonuses for top managers dramatically higher and 
rising sharply relative to those of ordinary workers.  Earnings 
of the top 0.1 percent of income recipients rose relative to 
averages for the base of the employment compensation pyramid -- 
the bottom 90 percent -- from roughly 20 times the base average 
during the 1960s and 1970s to 70 times in the early years of the 
21st Century.
22   
 
  Tracing U.S. income distribution patterns over the course 
of a century, Piketty and Saez (2003) show that the share of 
total U.S. wage and capital income gained by the most affluent 
one percent of tax return filers (usually families) fell from a 
peak in 1929, stabilized in the range of 8 to 11 percent between 
the 1950s and the 1980s, and then rose briskly to 14.6 percent 
in 1998 and an even higher value in 2007.
23  See the solid line 
in Figure 6.11.  When wage shares alone are tallied, a doubling 
of the top one percent's share is seen between 1970 and 1998 
 
20     .  See e.g. Autor et al. (2006) and more generally Goldin and Katz (2008). 
21     .  See Frank and Cook (1995). 
22     .  See "Spare a Dime?  A Special Report on the Rich,' The Economist, April 4, 2009, p. 4. 
23     .  Drawn from Tables II and IV in Piketty and Saez (2003).  Because high-income earners 
are better able to accumulate wealth than low earners, the distribution of wealth is even more 
concentrated than the distribution of income.  For the Piketty - Saez sample in 1998, the top 10 
percent of income earners reported 41.4 percent of total U.S. income, whereas the same group 
had 65.9 percent of U.S. families' net worth, compared to 2.0 percent of net worth for the bottom 
20 percent of income earners.  The net worth share of the top ten percent rose to 70 percent in 
2007.  See Bucks et al. (2009), p. A11.  
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(dashed line in Figure 6.11).  And while the rich were becoming 
richer relative to the middle class in income before taxes, 
rates of income taxation for the top income brackets were 
reduced -- e.g., in the United States from 91 percent in the 
1950s to 50 percent in the 1970s, 40 percent in the 1990s, and 
35 percent in the early years of the 21st Century.  
  
  For the United Kingdom and France, top tier income shares 
declined until the early 1980s and then rose, but more gradually 
than in the United States.
24   The extent to which income is 
concentrated in the hands of the most affluent does vary from 
nation to nation, depending upon public policies as well as 
national levels of economic development.  During the 1990s, for 
example, the share of income received by the richest 20 percent 
of income earners is reported by United Nations sources to have 
varied as follows among a cross-section of highly developed 
nations:
25 
 
  New  Zealand    46.9% 
  United  States    46.4   
  United  Kingdom    43.0 
  France       40.2 
  Germany     38.5 
  Italy    36.3 
  Japan    35.7 
  Denmark     34.5 
  Sweden     34.5% 
 
  Certainly, in the leading capitalist nations, nothing like 
the immiserization predicted by Marx can be found for all but 
small minorities of the population.  Nevertheless, trends toward 
increasing inequality and stagnation of middle-class incomes 
during recent decades provide grounds to fear a rising tide of 
discontent among the average citizens of classically capitalist 
nations. 
  IV.  Capitalism and Economic Fluctuations 
 
  Another characteristic of capitalism -- recognized already 
 
24     . Piketty and Saez (2003), Figure XII.  
25     .  United Nations Development Programme (2000), p. 172.  
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by Karl Marx and emphasized by Joseph Schumpeter
26 -- is the 
tendency toward fluctuations in economic activity, or more 
pejoratively, crises.
27  Abstracting from the "Great Depression" 
of the early 1930s, seen in Figure 6.2 to be especially severe 
for the United States and the United Kingdom, and the major 
slump of 2008-2010, Figure 6.12 provides perspective on the 
phenomenon for the more normal times following World War II up 
to 1999.  The dominant picture remains one of growth in GDP per 
capita.  But that growth is marred by occasional interruptions 
and downturns -- notably, in mild recessions centered on 1954, 
1958, 1970, and 1991 and in the somewhat sharper recessions 
following from an abrupt oil price surge and shift of purchasing 
power to OPEC in 1974-75 and the inflation-fighting "double-dip" 
recession of 1980-82.  
  
  The control of capital by private individuals or groups is 
the essence of capitalism.  Capital is accumulated through 
investment, and changes over time in investment activity are the 
leading cause of economic fluctuations.  An over-simplified 
notion of how fluctuations emerge is provided by the so-called 
"accelerator" model.
28  It is assumed that businesses are 
operated most efficiently when they maintain a more or less 
fixed ratio k of capital to their output.  That is, K* = kQ*.  
If the growth of output dQ/dt is steady, investment I is 
approximately equal to dK/dt and can be adjusted to increase the 
capital stock at a relatively smooth rate over time.
29  But if 
for any reason -- a technological change, events related to war, 
harvest conditions, or a sudden increase in the monetary supply 
from the central bank or foreign sources -- Q rises by twice the 
expected growth increment, and if the increase is expected to be 
more than temporary, investment must be increased 
disproportionately  -- e.g., with a doubling of the Q increment, 
by twice the normal investment flow rate -- to maintain the 
desired proportionality of capital to output.  The jump in 
 
26     .  See Schumpeter (1939).  We adopt here the more agnostic "fluctuations" descriptor of 
Robert Aaron Gordon (1951) rather than agreeing that the movements are of cyclic regularity. 
27     .  A definitive history is Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and 
Crashes (5th ed., Wiley: 2005). 
28     .  The most seminal contribution was Harrod (1936). 
29     .  We ignore the complications introduced by depreciation.  
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investment, if correlated with many similar shocks throughout 
the economy, increases aggregate economic activity and income, 
and added spending generates multiplier effects that intensify 
the upward pressure on aggregate output.  At some point, 
however, the unexpected growth of output reaches limits and 
slows, putting the cyclical movement of investment and 
ultimately output into reverse.  The cutback in investment is 
likely to be sharper for quickly adjusted inventories than for 
longer-lived capital, giving rise to fluctuations that may vary 
in duration.   
 
  This is only a beginning, however.  The unanticipated rise 
in aggregate output and the accompanying increases in investment 
may in themselves make businessmen more optimistic about future 
profit prospects.  Their optimism may be heightened if prices 
and profits rise because of capacity constraints and/or 
increased money supply.  Investment, John Maynard Keynes 
observed famously (1936, p. 161), is driven by expectations, and 
the favorable expectations generated by an upswing may excite 
businessmen's "animal spirits," inducing more of an investment 
increase than the objective facts warrant.  The upward movement 
or boom is amplified.  But as limits to output growth are 
approached and a downward adjustment of investment is signalled, 
negative accelerator and multiplier effects are compounded by 
excess capacity, price reductions, and a sharp decline in 
profits, turning the animal spirits negative and reducing 
investment incentives all the more.  The fall in profits may be 
so sharp that borrowers -- both business firms and home mortgage 
holders -- default on their loans.  And if there is widespread 
and synchronized default on loans, banks may become insolvent, 
the more so, the more highly they have leveraged their lending 
in the hope of higher returns on equity.  Banks' difficulties in 
turn impair the flow of credit and turn what might have been a 
run-of-the-mill recession into a downward spiralling "panic." 
 
  With his emphasis on the role of innovation as a key source 
of economic growth, Schumpeter (1939) viewed fluctuations in 
innovative activity as a prime cause of macroeconomic 
fluctuations.  He recognized that innovations come in all sizes 
and shapes.  Only a few innovations are economy-transforming.  
The transformative innovations induce major increases in 
investment but also trigger waves of improvement inventions 
which call for further investments.  Increases in output 
stemming from the technological improvements themselves and the  
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facilitating investments stimulate further innovating efforts 
across a wider variety of fields. 
 
  Schumpeter stressed interaction effects among innovation, 
investment, and further innovation as propelling forces giving 
rise to a fairly regular oscillation of long upturns and 
downturns.  An alternative hypothesis was advanced by William 
Nordhaus (1989).  He assumes that the distribution of economic 
effects associated with a random sample of inventions is not 
only skew, but that it conforms to the so-called Pareto-Levy 
distribution with an extremely long -- indeed, asymptotically 
infinite -- high-value tail.  Embedding this assumption in a 
large Monte Carlo simulation experiment, he shows that what is 
in fact a random walk of diverse economic impacts from 
inventions distributed plausibly over time gives rise to 
economic fluctuations that appear cyclical.  It is questionable 
whether the true underlying value distribution is indeed Pareto-
Levy rather than a somewhat less skew log normal form, but even 
with the latter, cyclical fluctuations resembling those observed 
in real-world business cycles are generated by Monte Carlo 
experiments.
30 
 
  With his emphasis on the clustering of innovations as a key 
stimulus to business upswings, Schumpeter (1939, p. 119) saw 
recessions as a necessary element in "harvesting" the fruits of 
creative destruction.  Widespread imitation of successful 
innovations makes the fruits of innovation more broadly 
available and, through intensified competition, reduces prices 
and raises average real (i.e., price-deflated) standards of 
living.  Obsolete technologies are at the same time vanquished 
from the economy. Schumpeter distinguished, however, between 
"recession," in which this working-out process occurs, and 
"depression," in which bankers and industrialists panic, choking 
off useful investment and aggravating unemployment.  Depression, 
he wrote (p. 131), unlike recession, "is a pathological process 
to which no organic functions can be attributed." 
 
  Schumpeter might from his birth and educational origins be 
considered an iconoclastic member of the "Austrian" school of 
business fluctuations analysis.  A more conventional Austrian 
was Ludwig von Mises, who, in place of technological innovation, 
 
30     .  See Harhoff and Scherer (2000).  
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emphasized the role of excessive credit expansion as the genesis 
of booms.  "The essence of the credit-expansion boom is not 
overinvestment, but investment in the wrong lines, i.e., 
malinvestment."
31  He continues (pp. 562-565): 
 
  As soon as the afflux of additional fiduciary media 
comes to an end, the airy castle of the boom collapses.... 
Factories are closed, the continuation of construction 
projects in progress is halted, workers are discharged... 
Accidental institutional and psychological circumstances 
generally turn the outbreak of the crisis into a panic.... 
[A] credit expansion boom must unavoidably lead to a 
process which everyday speech calls the depression.  [One] 
must realize that the depression is in fact the process of 
readjustment, of putting production activities anew in 
agreement with the given state of market data...  
[C]onsumers ... must for the time being renounce certain 
amenities which they could have enjoyed if the boom had not 
encouraged malinvestment.  But, on the other hand, they can 
find partial compensation in the fact that some enjoyments 
are now available to them which would have been beyond 
their reach if the smooth course of economic activities had 
not been disturbed by the orgies of the boom.  It is slight 
compensation only ... [but] it is the only choice left to 
them as conditions and data are now. 
 
  An extreme version of this view appears to have been held 
by ex-banker Andrew Mellon, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
between 1921 and 1932.  In President Herbert Hoover's 
(unauthorized) characterization of Mellon's philosophy, the 
recession "will purge the rottenness out of the system.  High 
costs of living and high living will come down.  People will 
work harder, live a moral life.  Values will be adjusted, and 
enterprising people will pickup the wrecks from less competent 
people."
32  In Hoover's synopsis, Mellon's formula was to 
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, 
liquidate real estate." 
 
  Needless to say, there are alternative perspectives that 
see depressions as sources of unwarranted and widespread pain, 
 
31     .  Mises (1949, 1996), p. 559.  See also Ebeling (1996). 
32     .  Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), p. 205, quoting from The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover.  
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to be avoided by appropriate public policy measures.  Paramount 
among these was John Maynard Keynes (1936), who stressed at pp. 
315-320 of his great work business investors' "animal spirits" 
as the cause of overinvestment and the eventual emergence of 
corrections: 
 
  [T]he basis for [investors' expectations] is very 
precarious.  Being based on shifting and unreliable 
evidence, they are subject to sudden and violent 
changes.... [I]t is not so easy to revive the marginal 
efficiency of capital, determined, as it is, by the 
uncontrollable and disobedient psychology of the business 
world... In conditions of laissez-faire the avoidance of 
wide fluctuations may, therefore, prove impossible without 
a far-reaching change in the psychology of investment 
markets such as there is no reason to expect.  I conclude 
that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment 
cannot safely be left in private hands. 
 
Keynes proposed (p. 327) as one corrective to exaggerated 
business fluctuations "a banking policy which always nipped in 
the bud an incipient boom by a rate of interest high enough to 
deter even the most misguided optimists."  As William McChesney 
Martin, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve system between 1951 
and 1970, observed memorably, "The job of the Federal Reserve is 
to take away the punch bowl just when the party starts getting 
interesting."
33  If preemptive action fails, Keynes visualized 
monetary policy easing as a means of encouraging depressed 
investment.  But that too could fail if business expectations 
are so bleak that a monetary supply surge sufficient to induce 
zero interest rates could not restore investment -- a condition 
described as "a liquidity trap."  In that instance, Keynes 
urged, only government stimulatory spending or government-
induced changes in the distribution of income that enhanced 
individuals' propensity to consume, e.g., through tax remissions 
and minimum wage laws, could save the economy from unwarranted 
suffering. 
 
 
 
 
 
33     .http://www.cbsnews.com/2316-100_162-975818-9.html.  
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  V.  Conclusion 
 
  "Capitalism," a witticism prevalent in the Soviet Union 
during the 1960s observed, "is the exploitation of man by man.  
Communism is the opposite." Indeed, capitalism is not without 
problems -- at times low wages, which might be viewed as 
exploitation, or even worse, a tendency toward occasionally 
violent fluctuations and involuntary unemployment.  But it is 
hard to conceive of a practical economic system exhibiting 
superior dynamic performance, notably, in the opportunity and 
incentive free markets provide to capitalistic entrepreneurs for 
technological innovation -- more efficient production processes, 
new products conferring superior consumer utility, and better 
methods of business organization -- which in turn has raised 
living standards by astonishing amounts.  The problem for public 
policy is to secure the dynamic benefits of capitalism while 
minimizing its negative side effects. 
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